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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
MARY HATHAWAY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
JAY L. MARX, FLOYD A. MARX, d/b/a 
CARBON ANIMAL BY-PRODUCTS 
COMPANY, and LUEY HADDOCK, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
11030 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by the owner-driver of an auto-
mobile for injuries arising out of an automobile ac-
cident which occurred June 27, 196t at approximate-
ly 11 :30 A.M. o'clock, on Highway 40. A collision 
occurred in a rural area at a dirt cross road as ap-
pellant attempted to pass respondent's truck. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried before the Honorable Joseph 
P. Nelson, sitting with a jury. The jury brought in a 
verdict of no cause of action. The Court instructed 
2 
the jury that the dirt road turnoff was an intersection. 
The jury apparently predicated its verdict upon ap-
pellant's contributory negligence in passing within 
100 feet of an intersection. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment of 
the lower court as a matter of law upon the grounds 
that the Court erred in instructing the jury that the 
site of the accident was at an intersection within the 
meaning of the statutes of Utah; that passing within 
100 feet of an intersection was unlawful. There was 
also irregularity on the part of a juror who stated to 
his fellows in the jury room material facts based on 
personal knowledge concerning material issues in 
the case which were not adduced in evidence. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant was driving west on Highway 40, ap-
proximately 10 miles west of Roosevelt, Utah, on the 
27th day of June, 1961, at approximately 11:30 
o'clock A.M. The weather was clear and visibility 
was good. Highway 40, at the location of the acci-
dent, is relatively straight, and as the Highway ap-
proache·s the dirt road turnoff from the east, there 
is a slight descent. About one-half mile to the east 
of the dirt road, Lake Boren turnoff, there is a crest 
of a hill so that a motorist traveling westerly is not 
able to observe the dirt road turnoff until driving 
over the crest of the hill and on the descent de-
scribed. Once over the crest of the hill, Highway 40 
cctn be observed for a considerable distance beyond 
the dirt road turnoff. The Lake Boren turnoff from 
Highway 40 for a motorist traveling west, as appel-
lant was traveling in this case, is a paved roadway 
to the north, or to the right, and to the south, or left, 
there is a dirt road. Exhibit P.5 clearly shows the dirt 
road described. and Exhibit P. 4 shows the Lake 
Boren Road. 
The testimony is uncontradicted that there were 
no highway signs, painted lines on the highway, or 
any marking of any kind to notify a motorist of an 
intersection at the dirt road turnoff (R. 16, 33). The 
dirt road, to the south, was sparsely traveled (R. 18-
19). The Lake Boren Road was more frequently 
traveled than the dirt road, particularly during fish-
ing season (R. 23). 
Highway 40 on each side of the dirt road-Lake 
Boren Road is widened with marked lanes for ac-
celeration as shown in Exhibits P. 2, P. 3, and P. 4. 
Appellant testified that as she approached de-
fendant's truck from the rear there was no other traf-
fic on the highway, and that she proceeded to pass 
defendant's truck which was moving at a slow rate of 
speed. Defendant's truck made no visible signals to 
indicate a left hand turn as both vehicles approached 
the vicinity of the dirt road turnoff and appellant 
was not aware of an intersection. Officer Harring-
ton, state trooper, who investigated the accident, 
testified that the turn signals on the truck did not 
work (R. 21), and further, that if they did, they would 
not be visible because they were covered with dirt 
(R. 22). Appellant proceeded to pass defendants 
truck, and simultaneously defendant Haddock 
turned the direction of the truck to make a turn onto 
the dirt road. The vehicles came to rest in the proxi-
mate position shown in Exhibits P. 1, 2, and 3. 
Instruction 16 (R. 45) of the trial court stated the 
following: 
"No vehicle shall at anv time be driven to the left 
side of the road when .. ·. approaching within 100 feet 
or on traversing any intersection". 
The trial court defined contributory negligence, 
then continued in Instruction No. 5, Proposition II 
l(b) (R. 37); 
"Plaintiff attempted to pass to the left of a vehicle 
at an intersection when it was unlawful to do so" 
(R. 37). 
The appellant objected to the Court giving in-
structions No. 5 and 16 (R. 165). 
POINT ONE 
THE DIRT ROAD TURNOFF AT THE ACCIDENT 
SCENE WAS NOT AN INTERSECTION WITHIN THE 
MEANING AND CONTEMPLATED CONSTRUCTION 
OF SECTION 41-6-58 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
WHICH PROHIBITS DRIVING ON THE LEFT SIDE OF 
A ROAD WITHIN 100 FEET OR ON TRAVERSING AN 
INTERSECTION. 
An intersection is defined in our Motor Vehicle 
Code as follows: 
"Section 41-6-8, Intersection - Crosswalk - Safety 
zone, Business, Residence, and Urban Districts (a) 
"Intersection". (1) The area embraced within the 
prolongation or connection of the lateral curblines, 
or if none, then the lateral boundary lines of the 
roadways of two highways which join one another at, 
or approximately at, right angles, or the area within 
~~i~h vehicles traveling upon different highways 
JOmmg at any other angle come in conflict." 
A Highway is defined as follows: 
"Section 41-6-7. Streets, highways, and roads and 
portions thereof (a) Street or Highway. The entire 
width between the boundary lines of every way pub-
licly maintained when any part thereof is open to the 
use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel ... " 
The State Road Commission has the authority 
and obligation to place highway traffic control de-
vices and signs. Section 41-6-20 UCA vests that right 
with the State Road Commission and directs it to 
adopt a manual and specifications for a uniform 
system of traffic-control devices consistent with the 
provisions of the Motor Vehicle Act. Section 41-6-21 
provides as follows: 
"Section 41-6-21. Placing and maintenance upon state 
highways. (a) The State Road Commission shall place 
and maintain such traffic-control devices in conform-
ance with its manual and specifications upon all state 
highways as it shall deem necessary to indicate and 
to carry out the provisions of this act or to regulate, 
warn or guide traffic." (Emphasis added.) 
The evidence is uncontradicted that the State 
Highway Commission did not place any control to 
regulate, warn, or guide traffic traveling on High-
way 40 as that Highway approached the dirt road-
Lake Boren turnoff that an intersection existed. In 
fact, a motorist passing as appellant did in this case. 
would only see the dirt road to the left of the high-
way which would appear as another farm lane. 
A double painted line did not warn a motorist 
that he could not travel to the left hand side of the 
highway. In the instant case Exhibits P. 3 and P. 4 
clearly show that a broken white stripe indicating 
the middle of the highway was the only marking 
on the highway. Such a marking did not prohibit 
passing or traveling to the left hand side of a high-
way. There were not regulatory signs indicating that 
the dirt road-Lake Boren turnoff existed or that an 
intersection even existed. Obviously, the State Road 
Commission did not classify the dirt road-Lake Boren 
turnoff as an intersection, for it did not use its author-
ity to notify the public of its existence. 
The Utah State Road Commission has adopted a 
Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for 
Streets and Highways/I published by the United 
States Department of Commerce. This manual, so 
far as it pertains to no passing zones and intersec-
tions, provides a!:? follows: 
Section C (p. 53) of the Manual provides for the 
use of warning signs. Section K-10, Cross Road Sign 
I/Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Division for Streets and Highways, 
prepared by the National Joint Committee on Uniform Traffic Control 
Devices; American Association of Highway Officials, Institute of Traffic 
Engineers, National Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances, 
National Association of County Officials, and American Municipal Asso-
ciation, herein referred to as the "Manual". 
(W 2-1) (P. 60) provides: 
"The Cross Road sign, showing a vertical cross sym-
bol, shall be erected on a through highway to indi~ate 
the presence of a cross road. I ts use should be restrict-
ed to intersections with roads that are improved to 
such an extent that there is likely to be a fairly large 
volume of traffic entering or crossing the through 
route and where poor sight distance or obscured en-
trances make it advisable that the intersection be 
called to the motorists's attention. It should not 
ordinarily be used where Junction signs (sec. lD-13) 
or Advance Turn Arrows (sec. lD-15) are present. 
Cross Road signs should not be erected at unimproved 
intersecting roads. Too frequent use of the Cross 
Road sign should be avoided." 
Part II, "Markings" in the Manual provides un-
der 2A-4 "Types of Markings" (P. 114): 
"Markings as defined for the purpose of this manual 
are of a number of types: 
1. Pavement Markings: 
(c) No-passing zone markings (Sec. 2B 7 
to 10)". 
"2B-8 No Passing Zones Markings (P. 123) pro-
vides: 
"A no-passing zone shall be marked by a solid ba~rier 
line placed as the right-hand eleme~t of a ?ombm.a-
tion line along the center or lane lme. This barner 
line shall be yellow. 
The barrier line shall be not less than 4 nor 
more than 6 inches wide, and shall be separated 
from the adjacent line by a space of not less than 3 
nor more than 4 inches." 
"2B-9 Application of No-Passing Zones Mark-
ings" (P. 123) states: 
"On a two-lane highway the combination no-passing 
line shall follow the center line throughout the no-
passing zone ... In no case shall the marking be less 
than 500 feet in length. If the actual no-passing dis-
tance is less than 500 feet, the additional length of 
marking shall be added at the beginning of the zone 
... The no-passing barrier line is also used on two-
way roadways at pavement-width transitions (sec. 
2B-14) and on approaches to obstructions which must 
be passed on the right (sec. 2B-18). It may also be 
used on approaches to intersections." 
The physical facts are that Highway 40 is wider 
on each side of the Lake Boren turnoff, but this 
would not alert a motorist of its being an intersec-
tion, for Highway 40 between Soldiers Summit and 
the Colorado border is widened and narrowed re-
peatedly with and without markings. 
This court has had occasion to consider a simi-
lar physical fact situation as the dirt road-Lake Boren 
turnoff in Douglas v. Giganden (1958) 332 Pac. 2d 
932, 8 Utah 2d 245. That case involved a motorist 
who commenced passing a pickup truck who's 
driver, without warning, commenced to make a left 
hand tum onto Peters Point Road. There were no 
highway markings to prohibit passing or were there 
any regulatory signs indicating the intersection of 
Peters Point Ro3.d with the main highway. This 
Court rightly held that Peters Point Road was not 
an intersection within the meaning of our statutes. 
The same test applies here. The State Road Com-
'.::1 
mission m both situations did not prohibit passing 
by establishing no-passing zones either through the 
use of painted markings on the highway or regula-
tory signs pursuant to its Manual. A traveler using 
Highway 40 in the vicinity of the dirt road-Lake 
Boren turnoff would not know the purported inter-
section by reason of its physical location, i.e. a dirt 
road cross secting the main highway in a farming 
community. The State Road Commission would 
have marked the intersection if in fact it was one. 
As a matter of law, an intersection did not exist and 
the trial court erred in instructing the jury as to the 
law concerning intersections. 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING 
THE JURY THAT IT WAS UNLAWFUL FOR APPEL-
LANT TO PASS TO THE LEFT OF A VEHICLE AT AN 
INTERSECTION. 
The Trial Court charged that appellant would 
be guilty of contributory negligence in Instruction 
No. 5, Proposition 1 B, to-wit: 
"Plaintiff attempted to pass to the left of a vehicle 
at an intersection when it was not lawful to do so" 
(R. 37). 
This error was further developed in Instruction 
No. 16 when the Trial Court instructed as follows: 
"The laws of the state provide ... no vehicle at any 
time should drive to the left side of the road way 
when approaching ... within 100 feet or on travers-
ing any intersection ... " 
.I.\) 
The dirt road turnoff that defendant's truck was 
turning into simply was not an intersection within 
the contemplation of Section 41-6-8 UCA 1953 and 
was not recognized as such by the State Road Com-
mission for the reasons set forth in Point I, as a mat-
ter of law, the above instructions were erronious. 
POINT THREE 
APPELLANT WAS PRECLUDED FROM HAVING A 
FAIR TRIAL WHEN A JUROR WITHHELD FROM THE 
COURT HIS PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACCI-
DENT BY REASON OF HAPPENING UPON THE 
SCENE IMMEDIATELY AFTER ITS OCCURRENCE 
AND SO TESTIFIED TO HIS FELLOW JURORS ON 
MATERIAL FACTS NOT IN EVIDENCE IN THE JURY 
ROOM. 
The jury foreman advised counsel for respon-
dent that he happened upon the scene of the acci-
dent shortly after its occurrence, and observed 
Stansfield there and so advised the jury in the jury 
room. The jury foreman did not advise the Court of 
his presence at the scene of the accident shortly 
after it occurred. 
Mr. Stansfield, a prospective juror was chal-
lenged for cause during the impanelling of the jury 
and was excused by the Court. Though the court 
reporter did not record the testimony, counsel for re-
spondent will agree that Mr. Stansfield knew de-
fendants, was their business associate, and a long 
time personal friend of defendant Haddock; for these 
relationships, the trial judge granted appellant's 
counsel challenge for cause. 
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Mr. Stansfield remained in the courtroom and 
took the stand on respondents behalf, testifying that 
he observed the accident by reason of his position 
as he traveled west on Highway 40 behind appel-
lant. Further, his testimony was contradictory to 
Trooper Harrington, for he said the signal lights of 
defendant's vehicle were working and in fact were 
blinking, indicating a left hand turn just prior to the 
accident. Upon cross examination it was brought out 
not only did Mr. Stansfield have a business acquaint-
ance with respondents, but he had a firm opinion 
that appellant was responsible for the accident orig-
inating, supposedly .. from his first hand observation 
of the accident which he withheld from the Court 
while he was under consideration as a juror (R. 127). 
The jury foreman failed to acknowledge upon 
inquiry by the trial court that he had been at the 
scene of the accident. The jury foreman told his fel-
low jurors that he happened upon the scene of the 
accident shortly after it happened and Mr. Stans-
field was present. He knew that Stansfield was tell-
ing the truth concerning the left hand turn signals 
of defendant's truck and that they were properly 
working. It was material for the jury foreman to 
acknowledge that he had been at the scene of the 
accident shortly after its occurrence, for questions 
could have been put to him as to whether or not he 
had a preformed opinion concerning the accident 
and its cause as did Mr. Stansfield (R. 127). The jury 
foreman stating to his fellows in the jury room that 
he had been present at the accident and seen Mr. 
Stansfield was a material fact based upon personal 
